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我们在评价 Ronen 的 IFSI 机制（即专业保险公司主导的财务报表保险
机制）的基础上，引出了 AFSI 机制（即审计师主导的财务报表保险机制）
以及审计定价的实务模型的讨论。我们认为，若审计事务所的规模不小于





















Four sources of demand for hiring auditing services have been proposed in 
existing literatures: to reduce agency costs （agency cost hypothesis）, to signal 
outsiders about company’s prospects （signaling hypothesis）, to indicate the 
value of the audit in improving resource allocation （informational value 
hypothesis） and to provide a potential source of loss recovery for investors 
（insurance hypothesis）. Although considerable research has been done in the 
area, each source of demand is often discussed in respective theory, and even 
some are considered to be incompatible with each other. The objective of this 
dissertation is to integrate above-mentioned theories and formulate uniform 
theoretic model of the `demand for audit services. 
In our dissertation, agency cost hypothesis and signaling hypothesis are 
discussed in the same theory, namely informational value hypothesis. So the 
demand for audit arises from both informational signaling and insurance 
signaling, and informational value is regarded as authentification value in our 
dissertation, which is different from exiting literatures. Therefore, audit value 
results from the roles of two components: an authentification role and an 
insurance role. The former relies on audit quality differences, while the latter 
rests on differences in quasi-insurance coverage provided in the event of 
securities litigation. Those two incentives of hiring auditing services are 
referred to in our dissertation as dual value of audit hypothesis. 
There are three successive stages in the development of audit institution: 
pure-authentification mechanism, quasi-authentification mechanism and 
pure-insurance mechanism. At the first stage, audit value only depends on 
differences in audit quality which results in authentification value. At the 
second stage, audit value includes both authentification value and insurance 
value. At the last stage, audit value is entirely composed of insurance value, 
which is the option value of claim provided for investors. Our analysis 
demonstrates that, the present audit institution in US is quasi-authentification 
mechanism, and that China is transforming itself from pure-authentification 














model based on above discussions, and describe different stages of audit 
institution in the uniform audit value model, which constitutes the positive 
models of audit pricing, together with audit cost model and audit fee model in 
the dissertation.  
After reviewing the mechanism of financial statement insurance by insurer 
(IFSI), which is first put forward by Ronen in 2002, we bring forth a new one, 
namely mechanism of financial statement insurance by auditor (AFSI). And 
then we develop applied model of audit pricing based on financial statement 
insurance (FSI). We make the conclusion that, AFSI mechanism is preferable to 
IFSI mechanism, on condition that the size of audit firm is no smaller than 
insurance company. As a result, auditors will play an important role in the future 
FSI market.  
In this dissertation, we also discuss some present problems and future 
development of audit institution in China and give some proposals. 
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导  言 
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务所 31 日宣布告别从事近 90 年的审计业务前一天，安达信国际事务所宣
布，事务所与安然公司及其员工和股东达成了两项协议。根据协议，安达







                                                        























达300亿美元的损失赔偿要求（Arens & Loebbecke, 1997）。面临如潮的审
计诉讼案件和越来越严峻的民事法律责任，审计师、审计事务所和审计职
业界将何以自处？正因为审计诉讼风险的增大，在美国，自80年代以来，
审计理论界开始流行审计保险假说（Kellogg, 1984; Wallace, 1987;  













                                                        
① 在本文，审计师的概念包含审计事务所，而且为使前后一贯，分别用审计师和审计事务所替代注
册会计师和会计师事务所，两者意义无差异。 




















































































































Kellogg（1984）, Wallace（1987）, O’Reilly et al.（2000）认为，若审
计师在审计失败后能给投资者的投资损失提供某种程度的补偿，那么这相
当于给投资者提供了某种形式的保险。于是，他们就把这种审计需求理论
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